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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

# THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY IN DOMESTIC OPERATIONS: A STRATEGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

BY

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## **USAWC Strategic Research Project**

# The Future of the Army in Domestic Operations: A Strategy for the 21st Century

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#### **ABSTRACT**

With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the military transitioned from a containment strategy to one of engagement. As a consequence, the Army is currently changing from a forward deployed, threat based force to a power projection, capabilities based force.

While the military completes this transformation, the focus of the national leadership has shifted from the international scene to that of the domestic arena. As the nation's focus has changed, and we complete the downsizing of Army forces, we have witnessed a rise in the number of domestic missions for the Army. The issue of whether or not the Army should be involved in support of domestic operations continues to be a controversial one. As this debate continues, there is ample evidence to demonstrate that the Army has a long standing history of providing support to the nation. It is within reason to expect that the Army will continue to do so in the future if the nation's leadership continues to focus on the domestic agenda.

Despite the fact that the military has played a significant role in the development of the nation, there has never been a stated strategy or policy for the employment of military forces in the domestic arena. With a smaller force and a reduced budget in the future, we can ill afford to continue without such a strategy.

This paper outlines some components of a domestic strategy for the employment of military forces. In doing so, the author examines the historical roles and limitations of the military in the domestic arena. In addition, he identifies the domestic challenges and threats that the nation currently faces, as well as some military assets that may be used to address those threats. A key issue is that, unlike any other time in recent history, the country has the opportunity to utilize wisely some of the Army's resources to promote domestic prosperity.

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The end of the cold war has found those of us in the military scrambling to better define our purpose. While the civilian sector immediately saw and seized an opportunity to make significant reductions in the size of our military forces and thereby our defense budget, military leaders frantically fought to prevent our forces from being hollowed out. Our ultimate goal, of course, is not to allow ourselves to experience another Task Force Smith, and thereby not send our sons and daughters to a future battlefield unprepared and woefully under resourced.

Recent domestic and global events have caused our National Command Authority to develop a vision that maintains the United States as a dominant player in the international arena, clearly capable of setting the global agenda. This vision led the National Command Authority to develop a National Security Strategy that calls for forward presence and peacetime engagement. It mandates that our armed forces operate efficiently throughout the operational continuum from the promotion of peace to the fighting of our nations' wars. The focus of forces on the promotion of peace end of the continuum includes nation assistance, counterdrug, anti - terrorism, and peacekeeping.

Although we maintain a National Security Strategy of engagement and enlargement, it is evident that the recent focus of our national leadership has been on domestic issues. Since the Army has a long standing history of providing support to the nation, it is reasonable to expect that our leadership may look to the Army to play a greater role in the promotion of domestic prosperity.

The current National Security Strategy certainly provides the military the flexibility

to operate in the domestic arena. However, with a downsized Army, and an increased operational tempo, the Army will need to continuously conduct a balancing act if it is called upon to provide more support to the nation while maintaining an appropriate level of readiness. If the military is called upon to play a more active role in domestic assistance, we will need a coherent strategy that exploits the resources of the Army for the benefit of the nation while enabling the Army to remain combat ready.

The purpose of this paper is to outline the elements of a domestic strategy. This strategy is based upon an analysis of the current and future challenges and threats to our domestic well-being, and the resources that the Army has to offer that may be of benefit to the nation. Since we currently have no near peer military competitor, we have a window of opportunity to utilize some of the vast resources of the Army to benefit the nation. Our traditional approach to this subject has caused us to focus more on activities such as disaster relief and providing assistance to civil law enforcement authorities. Perhaps a more creative approach to the issue of domestic support will better enable us to achieve the goals of maintaining combat readiness and providing support to the nation.

#### THE DOMESTIC FOCUS

The combination of the loss of a significant Soviet threat and the advent of the information age has had an interesting and dramatic impact on the American perspective. While the loss of the Soviet threat caused Americans to reexamine military expenditures, our ability to monitor continuously and subsequently compare ourselves with the economic situations in other countries caused many to conclude that unless we pay attention to some key domestic issues, other nations may soon surpass us economically. We have thereby developed a "Domestic Issues First" attitude in America. We resolved that if we are, indeed, serious about maintaining the position of world leader, there are some key issues that need to be addressed first. These include our economy .... specifically the budget deficit, our education system, our drug problem, and our health care concerns, to name a few.

The information age has also had the effect of enabling the average American citizen to be acutely aware of world events as they happen. This increased awareness has had the net effect of causing us to become more involved as a nation in the alleviation of pain and suffering world wide, even when we do not have a clear vital interest in a particular region. The result has been a dramatic increase in the number of deployments for our military forces in recent years. It was the scene of massive starvation in Somalia against a background of rotting food supplies that created a groundswell for our

in the aftermath of hurricane Andrew that brought about the quick commitment of Joint forces to disaster relief. Indeed, it was the television image of a scene of incredible carnage and starvation that committed us to provide humanitarian relief in Rwanda. Last but not least, the daily drama of Bosnia played out on network television has launched us on an unprecedented peacekeeping role in the former Republic of Yugoslavia. With the drawdown of forces and the increase in domestic and international missions in operations other than war, the U.S. Army is as busy as it has been since the Korean War.

Understanding that the primary mission of the military is to fight and win our nations' wars, military leaders are troubled by the fact that a reduction in forces and an increase in non - traditional missions could lead to an eventual lack of readiness to fight and win the first battle. During the period 1950 - 1989, our Army conducted 10 major deployments. From 1990 to the present, our Army has deployed 25 times. That is an increase in missions by a factor of 16.2 While our strategy in the past been focused on fighting two major regional contingencies, our future strategy may be based upon our ability to fight one major regional contingency and a "Now" contingency. The Now contingency includes all of those current deployments, all of the peacetime engagement functions, all of the international non - traditional missions, and all of the non - traditional missions on the domestic front.

Jeff Brown skillfully demonstrated in his thesis titled, "Nontraditional Missions and the U.S. Military: Past, Present and Prospects," that in the realm of domestic missions, the focus for the Army has changed in conjunction with the evolution of America. As America has grown, so has the nature of the non - traditional missions in the domestic arena changed. The American focus has shifted from an overarching international concern to one for domestic prosperity. Key governmental figures have already begun to attempt to shift the current focus of the military to cause the armed forces to become more relevant in domestic affairs. A recent example of this came in 1993, when Senator Sam Nunn submitted an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act. This amendment prescribed a Civil - Military Cooperative Action Program. The focus of the amendment was to better capitalize on the vast resources available in the armed forces in order to promote domestic prosperity.

While the idea of utilizing the military in an increased domestic capacity is anathema to some, the point of the matter is that the military already plays a significant role in the domestic arena. Since 1972, Joint forces have been called upon to respond to 24 major crises in the United States. In addition, between 1990 and 1993, the United States military spent 10.4 billion dollars on domestic operations. Although that is a mere fraction of the total defense budget, it is significant when you consider that it will probably amount to one fifth of the 1998 Army budget of about 60 billion dollars.

Some senior military officials express concern that an increase in domestic missions may spell a decrease in readiness. Since our primary mission is to fight our nations' wars, perhaps that is where our focus should remain. If not, then we stand a chance of becoming a "Red Cross with rifles" organization. However, the Army has a long-standing history of providing support to our nation. It is reasonable to expect that it will continue to do so in the future. The current and future challenges and threats to our domestic prosperity are significant. The Army clearly has the resources to become more relevant in the area of domestic support when one considers the full spectrum of resources available. Most important, unlike any other time period since the beginning of the Cold War, we have an opportunity. We should take advantage of that opportunity. In order for us to maximize our efforts in the domestic arena, we need a coherent strategy that will prescribe how we go about utilizing our assets.

In the development of a strategy for the Army's' operations in the domestic arena, it is appropriate to briefly examine the Army's historical roles and limitations in providing support to our nation, discuss the need for such a strategy, examine the significant challenges and threats to the domestic arena, and finally outline the strategy for domestic operations for the 21st century.

#### HISTORICAL PRECEDENT

It should come as no surprise to anyone that the Army has a long standing history of providing domestic support to our nation. Some of the more notable contributions took place in the infancy of this great nation. Many of us are vaguely familiar with the famed exploits of the great explorers Lewis and Clark. Remarkably enough however, few people tend to recall that their official titles were Captain Meriwether Lewis and William Clark (former lieutenant in the Army). Their heroic efforts in the West enabled them to locate potential sites for forts to protect settlers and facilitate trade with the Native American. They thereby played a rather significant role in the ultimate expansion of the economy. In addition, they accumulated a substantial amount of scientific and geographic information that proved invaluable.

As the country continued its westward expansion, the Army contributed considerably to the development of the nation by protecting settlers and securing trade routes. From the very beginning, the Army played a critical role in the building and mapping of roads and trails. Following war with Mexico it sustained this effort. In addition, it also provided key contributions in locating routes for the railroads.<sup>8</sup> After the Civil War, the Corps of Engineers performed a significant amount of work on the nation's waterways and harbors.<sup>9</sup> This, once again, had a notable impact on trade.

Perhaps one of the most memorable undertakings of the Army in the domestic arena was that of administering the Civilian Conservation Corps. Upon the direction of the President, the Departments of War, Labor, Agriculture, and the Interior combined to execute a program that put jobless Americans to work. In retrospect, this was a classic example of the Army's providing assistance to the nation by facilitating interagency cooperation, and providing command, control and training assets.

In terms of providing support during domestic crises, the Army's operational history extends back to the very beginning of our country. One of the earliest examples of the Army's assistance in domestic peacekeeping was in 1786 when the militia was used to abort an attack on the Springfield arsenal by a group of rebels led by Daniel Shay. The next example followed eight years later in 1794 when the President used the military as a show of force to ensure the execution of federal law.<sup>11</sup>

In the nation's attempt to secure the Western frontier, the Army played a dominant role in the pacification and resettlement of Indian tribes. The Army's efforts in this area date back to this country's earliest days when President Washington used the militia to protect settlers against Indian tribes. From 1850 to 1860, there were no less than 25 Indian Wars. Following the Civil War, Americans resumed the quest for land, gold and commerce, and continued to expand westward with greater energy. Faced with a choice of surrender or survival, the Indian chose to resist white American incursions. As a result, the

Army fought a guerrilla war that spanned a 25 year period. It was indeed, a gruesome war that was characterized by, "skirmishes, pursuits, raids, expeditions, battles and campaigns of various sizes and intensity." Overall, the Army engaged the Native American in over a thousand separate actions, large and small, across the American West. The end result was the severe depredation of Native Americans and the deprivation of property rightfully owned by them. These actions were conducted as a part of America's efforts to expand the economy and promote domestic prosperity. It is certainly not the best chapter in Army history. However, it is one that illustrates the traditional Army involvement in domestic affairs.

The use of soldiers in a domestic peacekeeping role can easily damage the image of the Army. A good example of this is the President's use of the Army to disperse "Bonus Marchers" in 1932. In July of that year, thousands of veterans remained in Washington after the adjournment of Congress destroyed their hopes for the immediate payment of a bonus for military service during World War I. The attempts of police to break up the demonstration evoked a riot. As a result, President Hoover ordered the military to intervene. The soldiers quickly diffused the situation without firing a shot, and with minimal injuries. From a military perspective, the operation was carried out in an exemplary fashion. However, the use of the military against veterans significantly tarnished the Army's image. There have since been numerous contemporary examples of the Army's involvement in domestic peacekeeping operations. These include

the Vietnam War protests, and more recently, the Los Angeles riots. Each of these operations presented substantial challenges to the Army due to the risk associated with using military force against civilians.

Many people are familiar with the Army's recent rather impressive record in providing humanitarian assistance in times of crises. Few however, realize that the Army's role in the provision of humanitarian assistance in the domestic arena dates back to 1871 when the Army provided assistance in controlling the Chicago fire of 1871. In 1906, the Army once again demonstrated its capabilities by providing humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of the San Francisco earthquake.<sup>15</sup>

This long and distinguished history of providing support to the nation in times of need, in terms of the protection of its citizens, the promotion of the economy, exploration and scientific research, domestic peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance, has caused the citizens of this country to regard its military as one of its greatest assets.

#### LIMITATIONS

Notwithstanding the sterling record of the military in supporting the domestic agenda, the relationship between the military and the civilian leadership of the country has not always been one of unconditional trust. In fact, reflecting a long tradition dating to colonial days, civilians are generally suspicious of the military. As such, the civilian leadership has placed significant constraints (must do) and restraints (cannot do) on our military when it comes to employment of military forces in the domestic arena.

Legal authority to employ the military in domestic affairs is provided to the President by the Constitution. Article I of the Constitution gives the President the authority to, "Call forth the militia to suppress insurrection." As stated earlier, the first example of this was "Shays' Rebellion" in 1786. Article II of the Constitution enables the President to utilize the military to, "..... Preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution.... to ensure the execution of federal law." An excellent example of this was the President's employment of troops to enforce laws during the "Whiskey Rebellion" in 1794. Article IV of the Constitution provides the President with the ability to utilize force if requested by the states' legislatures. A good example of this was President Hayes' use of the military during the "West Virginia Riots of 1877." Forces were deployed from the Washington Arsenal and Ft. McHenry as a result of a request from the Governor of West Virginia.

Despite the authority granted the President by the Constitution to utilize military force in domestic affairs, the civil discomfort with military involvement in the domestic arena caused lawmakers to draft and enact the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. The Army played a significant role in the maintenance of domestic law and order during the Reconstruction period following the Civil War. Troops were frequently used to protect the civil rights of groups or individuals where the state would not, or could not provide that protection. The focus of the Posse Comitatus Act was to limit the role of federal forces in domestic peacekeeping operations.<sup>20</sup>

#### THE NEED FOR A STRATEGY

In spite of the increased role of the military in the domestic arena, and the vast amount of resources employed therein, we have yet to develop a coherent strategy for the employment of military forces in domestic situations. With the publication of the Department of Defense Directive 3025.15, "Military Assistance to Civil Authorities" dated 18 February, 1997, the Secretary of Defense outlined the most recent Department of Defense policy for domestic support. In addition, in an effort to prescribe tactics, techniques, and procedures for domestic support operations, the Joint military community has developed two publications. Field Manual 100 - 19, "Domestic Support Operations," is a joint

Army and Marine Corps publication. Joint Publication 3 - 07.7, "Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Domestic Support," is in draft form and will soon be published by the Joint Staff. The lack of a strategy has resulted in a lack of synergism when attacking complex issues that require interagency efforts. A cohesive strategy would enable us to ward off potential crises in some instances by identifying goals (ends) to which we as a part of an interagency process could deftly apply resources (ways/ means).

The development of a strategy would also enable us to develop operational objectives, organizational structure, tactics, techniques and procedures, and logistical support. This would, in turn, facilitate the development of doctrine, roles, and standards.

Some people speculate that further empowerment of the military in domestic affairs spells certain trouble for the future. Charles Dunlap, in a thought provoking article titled, "American Military Coup of 2012," outlines a future scenario in which the military systematically takes over the functions of government as a result of being enlisted to assist civil authorities in resolving key domestic problems such as crime and medical care. While this article sends a clear message of what could happen in the event of excessive military involvement in civil responsibilities, perhaps it does not give full credit to the desire of the American citizen to maintain a responsible democratic form of government. That desire is deep - rooted and deeply imbedded in our military ethos as well.

There also tends to be a prevailing stereotype that any assistance from the military equates to armed soldiers doing police type work on the streets of America. The public quite often fails to consider the full capabilities of the military. Perhaps that is because the average citizen does not know very much about our armed forces. There is a clear and distinct difference between increasing the military's domestic powers and utilizing the existing capabilities to the fullest extent possible in support of domestic operations. Our reluctance to wholly employ the military in domestic operations has been the result of a combination of three things. First, the monolithic threat of the Soviet empire held our focus on the containment of communism throughout the Cold War. Second is the suspicion and fear by many that the military would seek additional powers in the domestic arena if left unchecked. Third, the simple fact is that, on the average, most people see our military as a collection of guns and tanks. As such, they miss the essence of our military forces.

Americans will always be suspect of military resources being utilized in the domestic role, but perhaps that is not a bad thing. That attitude serves to force the military to maintain the proper perspective and balance. However, as American citizens learn more about the capabilities of their military, perhaps they will see that, although the military exists to fight our nation's wars, it clearly has additional competencies. In fact, one could easily build the argument that the core competencies of the Army are warfighting and human development. The Army in particular has always taken average people, and after some degree

of training, turned nearly all of them into better people .... more disciplined, and often with some sort of hard skill.

Following the Vietnam War, the Army recognized that although it would retain its core competence of human development, the nature of its human resources needed to change. Our civilian leadership demanded that the military become an all volunteer force. Despite fears that our efforts to create such a force would ultimately result in a mercenary Army, it has not. Many feel that the transition of the Army from its condition following the Vietnam conflict to what it is today was indeed a remarkable feat. By focusing on its core competencies of warfighting and human development, not only did the Army become exceptionally proficient in prosecuting Air - Land battle as witnessed in the Gulf War, it was able to transition into the most professional army that the world has ever seen. In the process, the Army rebuilt a noncommissioned officer corps that had essentially been destroyed by the Vietnam War.<sup>23</sup> Because of this, it became exceptionally proficient at training, managing change, leveraging diversity, and a number of other areas that the nation coincidentally finds itself struggling with today.

To gain a full appreciation of how the Army can be a significant contributor to domestic prosperity in the future, it is appropriate to look at the challenges and threats that we face in the domestic arena. In addition, it is of value to identify the assets that the military has at its disposal to contribute to this effort.

#### CHALLENGES and THREATS

Although one could debate at length on the root causes of our domestic problems, the central focus of the civilian leadership has been, and continues to be centered on the economy. While we have been leaders in the global community in the past due to a combination of our economic strength and military might, there are many who believe that in the very near future, economic strength will be the sole determinant of global power.<sup>24</sup> In spite of the fact that we are currently considered to be the most significant power in the global arena, some advocate that unless we focus on domestic issues, we will quickly lose that status.

As we struggle as a nation to deal with these issues, we do so in an environment that is characterized by revolutionary information availability magnified by systems networking. The global netting of information systems combined with the transnational nature of many of our corporations has created a setting where governments can no longer ensure exclusive control of information about their economic, domestic, or military affairs. Since our domestic issues have a direct impact on the global scene because of this netting of information systems, not only must we remain on the leading edge of technology, we must find better ways to guard against the unintentional proliferation of technology and products that could harm our security. In addition,

we must find better ways of protecting our systems from international manipulation, or interference from outside sources. The combination of transnational corporations and global netting of information can easily create a scenario whereby our policy makers are either prevented or delayed in carrying out policies or actions because a transnational enterprise controls the majority of assets in a particular arena.<sup>26</sup>

In terms of their influence on the economy, poverty, crime, a failing education system, and our inadequate system of health care are the major issues. These problems are multi-dimensional and complex. Crime, poverty and a troubled education system appear to be inextricably linked. Solutions to these problems will therefore be multi-tiered, and require interagency cooperation in the realm of law enforcement, economic aid, and social aid. An aging population and an inadequate national health care system further exacerbate our domestic concerns. While the nation feels that it is in the process of correcting the evils of what many have felt was an ineffective welfare program with welfare reform, we are, in general, concerned about the drain that entitlements will eventually place on the economy. In addition to these internal challenges, we have recently witnessed the emergence of minor insurgent movements in the form of hate groups and gangs. Even though these groups have generally always been embedded in our society, recently their numbers have increased ..... and they have had a far greater impact in terms of their acts of violence. Events such as the World Trade Center bombing, the Oklahoma

City bombing, and the arrest of Los Angeles members of the Fourth Reich indicate that not only does the threat of terrorism exist, but also that it could have a devastating impact on the nation.<sup>27</sup> The overall effect of the internal domestic challenges is a tearing of our social fabric, and an erosion of core values..... thus they are a threat to the American dream.

The external threats to our domestic prosperity are significant. However, unlike a significant military threat, most are not easily monitored. Foremost among the external threats is narco - terrorism. The amount of violent crime that is associated with drug trafficking is staggering to say the least. The volume of money associated with successful drug trafficking is of such magnitude that it has had the effect of corrupting key officials at almost every level of government.

The international illicit drug trade poses many threats. However, by far, the greatest of these is its almost unlimited ability to corrupt legitimate political institutions. There is no precedent for the scales of revenues that illegal drugs can create. As an example, in 1993, a metric ton of cocaine was worth between 100 million and 200 million dollars on the streets of America. That same year, U.S. law enforcement officials seized 108 metric tons of cocaine, worth between 10 billion and 20 billion dollars. Those figures easily exceed the gross domestic product of many of the countries in the hemisphere. The international illicit drug trade thereby gives criminals and terrorists access to revenues that are not available to some countries. <sup>28</sup> It has also had the effect of creating an operational network that is sophisticated and elusive. Law enforcement is only a

partial solution to this issue. Any meaningful proposals must include demand reduction. That will require a balance of providing information and modeling appropriate behaviors.

Another significant external threat is that of international organized crime.

Just as the proliferation of information systems has empowered transnational corporations, it has also had the effect of empowering organized crime. These groups now have access to information and technologies that in some cases provide them with the leverage of small nation states.

In addition to organized crime and narco- terrorism, we also face asymmetrical threats from ideologically or politically motivated groups. The targets of any asymmetrical threat would no doubt include our information networks, our industrial base, or our infrastructure. The National Command Authority has determined that certain infrastructures are vital to the stability of the nation. Their destruction would have a debilitating effect on our defense or economic security. Among these critical infrastructures are "... telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and oil storage and transportation, banking and finance, transportation, water supply systems, emergency services (including medical, police, fire and rescue) and continuity of government. Threats to them fall into two categories: physical threats to tangible property and threats of electronic, radio frequency, or communications components that control vital infrastructure (Cyber Threats). The concern for the protection of these vital infrastructures has prompted the President to issue

Executive Order 13010, "Critical Infrastructure Protection." Executive Order 13010 established the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. This Interagency group consists of two full time members from the Departments of the Treasury, Justice, Defense, Commerce, Transportation, and Energy, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Security Agency. The Department of Defense has been designated the lead agency for staffing and administrative support for the commission. The overwhelming challenges that this commission faces center on the fact that many of these critical infrastructures are privately owned and, of all the debilitating threats to these infrastructures, the majority of them are difficult to detect and profile.

Perhaps the least likely, yet clearly most dangerous threat is that of the employment of some type of weapon of mass destruction within the United States. With the dissolution of the Soviet empire, the accountability and control of many of the materials that can be used to produce weapons of mass destruction left much to be desired. This condition combined with global transfers of sensitive technologies could enable organized crime, rogue states or terrorists to gain access to some of these materials. While the employment of a weapon of mass destruction in the U.S. is currently a remote possibility, we need only look at the events in Japan surrounding the Sarin gas incident to be reminded that the reality of this threat grows each day.

#### **ASSETS**

The combination of the complex domestic issues that threaten the stability of our economy and the external threats to our domestic security creates a significant challenge for our leaders in the future. Contrary to the opinions of some, they are not threats fabricated in order to justify involving the military in domestic affairs, they are bona fide threats.<sup>31</sup> They are threats of such magnitude that, if left unchecked, could have the effect of diminishing our status as the preeminent global power.

Given these challenges, conceivably the Army can play a significant role in ameliorating conditions, limiting some of the threats and thereby expanding the economy. When many people think of the Army being involved in the domestic arena, they shudder at the prospect. For many, theirs is a vision of a "Red Cross with rifles" scenario, or a super militaristic police state with "big brother" spying on the average citizen. Executives and entrepreneurs may envision an encroachment by the military on free enterprise by controlling competition and providing free labor. These are all clear indications that, for the most part, the average citizen does not know or understand the true capabilities of its military ..... especially those of the Army.

As stated earlier, in addition to warfighting, human development is foremost among the Army's core competencies. The Army takes average

people and develops them into capable men and women who can perform professionally in challenging environments. These environments may range from providing humanitarian assistance to high intensity conflict. In all cases, the situations and environments are mentally and physically demanding. In order to ensure that soldiers are prepared to enter these types of situations, we provide them with demanding and meaningful training, and the best of equipment and resources on a daily basis. Towards this end, the Army has developed sophisticated and effective training programs that center on things such as skills mastery and leader development. The Army's focus is to ensure that each individual soldier is fully prepared to perform his or her job in any environment. Some would argue that the school systems in such places as Japan, Singapore and Taiwan are effective because they make their worst students perform well.<sup>33</sup> Obviously, the military's approach is the same. In terms of training and leader development, there is perhaps much that our civilian educational systems can benefit from.

Clearly, one of the Army's greatest success stories is that of providing opportunities regardless of race or gender. While far from perfect, the Army has been a leader in bringing about social change in this arena. Race is among America's most significant problem areas. The Army has coped with this issue better than any other large institution. It has thereby become adroit at producing the kinds of quality people that our leaders believe that America needs

in order to remain relevant in the next century. That is, quality people with established values rooted in the principles of the American dream.

The Army's warfighting competence has caused it to develop effective systems of analysis and problem solving. Keen analytical processes have traditionally enabled soldiers to quickly identify the root cause of complex issues, and their extraordinary abilities to coordinate systems have enabled the leadership to quickly and effectively mass resources to solve problems. Army leaders have proven that these same systems are effective whether it is providing humanitarian assistance to an American city in the aftermath of a devastating hurricane, or fighting a mid intensity conflict in Southwest Asia.

The critical common component in all of the Army's systems is, of course, the quality people who operate those systems. Unknown to many citizens, nearly all commissioned officers have a four year college education. Most field grade officers have graduate degrees. Many field grade officers have more than one graduate degree. When compared to mid level managers of most large organizations, the qualifications of the average Army officer probably exceed those of his or her civilian counterpart. The Army thereby has a tremendous pool of talented, trained and tested young men and women who are skilled in leadership. There is an enormous potential here for "Academic Engagement" .... the sharing of those experiences, lessons, and systems with civilian counterparts. We have witnessed recent examples of civilians capitalizing on this leadership potential with the appointment of General (retired) Barry

McCaffery to the position of Drug Czar, and the appointment of Lieutenant General (retired) Julius Becton to the position of Superintendent of Schools in Washington, D.C. These gentlemen bring fresh ideas and realistic solutions to some very old and unsolved problems.

In his article "Military Efficiency," James Fallows cites another example of an effective use of military assets. That is, the utilization of the military to foster infant industries. In fact, the military has a history of fostering developing technologies that dates back to the days of Eli Whitney. Today, America has strong aircraft and satellite industries partly because the military has, over a long period of time, subsidized research and collaborated with civilian industrial management.<sup>34</sup>

Operating throughout the spectrum of conflict has forced the Army to develop a significant amount of expertise in the interagency process.

Coordinating the efforts of agencies such as the Department of State,

Department of Justice, and the Department of the Interior are a part of operations that range from humanitarian assistance in Somalia to nation building in Haiti. As stated earlier, the Army's expertise in this arena dates back to as early as the days of the Civilian Conservation Corps. The Army can also contribute to a greater extent by providing training and structure to other federal agencies. In addition, it can conduct interagency crisis action planning exercises that will ensure that the nation stands ready to face the next domestic challenge.

In a crisis situation, the military is the agency of choice because of its proficiency

in crisis action planning, and its ability to mobilize and move resources on a moment's notice.

Along with its human resources, the Army has a significant amount of material resources. As the Army shifts gears and transitions to a power projection force, perhaps it is appropriate to utilize some of this equipment and material to assist the nation where appropriate. The vast majority of the need would probably be in the areas of engineering equipment, and medical equipment and supplies.

In his article "Justifying the Army," Colonel David Shaver briefly examines the feasibility of creating a separate branch of Army forces. These forces would be labeled "Domestic Support Forces". Their focus and expertise would be in the fields of health, engineering, transport, communications, information, intelligence, civil affairs, military police and environmental engineering/ cleanup. While the idea may have appeared far fetched during the Cold War, it no longer seems ill conceived.

Unlike other facets of our government, the military has long had the ability to accomplish things to advance the "Common Good." What the country now wants is an expanded economy that includes a better education system, control of crime, and better health care. In light of what has been addressed here, it is clear that, in a number of ways, the military can help. There is precedent to do so, there is a need, and certainly there are some assets available. Most important, unlike any other period in recent history, there is opportunity.

#### THE STRATEGY

Our National Security Strategy is one of engagement and enlargement. The objective of the strategy is to ensure the security of the U.S. as a free and independent nation while protecting its fundamental values, institutions and people.<sup>37</sup> In support of the National Security Strategy, the National Command Authority has developed a National Military Strategy of flexible and selective engagement. The objective of the military strategy is to assist in the advancement of national interests in peacetime, while maintaining readiness to fight and win when called upon.<sup>38</sup>

Since the military is already involved in the domestic arena in a significant fashion, and many anticipate that the military's role in this area in the future will expand, it is beneficial for us to craft a strategy that synchronizes the efforts in this area while meeting the objectives of the National Military Strategy .... to promote national interests in peacetime while maintaining our readiness to fight and win. Ideally, a well-crafted domestic strategy will prescribe the extent of military involvement in the domestic arena rather than letting our involvement force us to adopt ad hoc policies. While the development of a complete strategy is beyond the scope of this paper, our focus here is to address the possible components of such a strategy.

The overarching goal of our domestic strategy will be to assist in the promotion of domestic prosperity, economic growth, and domestic security. Our

efforts will thereby span a continuum that stretches from proactive engagement to crisis response. The major components of the proposed strategy are Academic Engagement, Crisis Prevention, Crisis Response, and Consequence Management.

Academic Engagement: Academic Engagement enables the country to benefit from the vast amount of intellectual and training resources available in the Army. Since it is foremost in the nation in leader training, the Army can directly benefit corporate America by providing some leadership training to mid - level and junior corporate leaders. In addition, it can offer the same service to communities, where feasible. Junior leadership programs provide the ability not only to promote the importance of values, but also to provide bona fide role models for youth.

Fostering Developing Technologies is a critical component of the Army's efforts in the realm of Academic Engagement. The intent is to continue to encourage, collaborate, and support civil research and development efforts that benefit the "Common Good." Research in the realm of effective explosives detection devices that would be of benefit in the area of airport security is an example of such a proposed collaborative effort.

Interagency Facilitation is also a component of Academic Engagement.

The Army's expertise in the interagency process enables it to render a potential service to the nation by providing instruction to other government agencies both

at the federal and local levels. Crisis action planning and information sharing are two key components of the Army's potential contribution in interagency facilitation. Once common goals have been identified, Army personnel can easily train others on how to consolidate resources to effectively address problems.

Another important component of Academic Engagement is sharing the Army's Systems and Procedures for Analysis. Its ability to expertly analyze information and identify core issues and problems is matched by few organizations in the world. The Army's analytical systems and procedures have proven effective in a myriad of environments ranging from conflict to peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. By combining competencies from the intelligence, communications, and information fields, it can directly benefit other local and federal agencies with training and, or skills.

Strategic Planning is an area in which the Army can provide significant benefit to the domestic arena. As members of the Joint military community, like the other services, the Army continues to develop officers who are adept at formulating strategy. This enables the Army to provide assistance in planning in a number of areas; e.g., counterterrorism, crime, and counterdrug. Although the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits direct involvement in some aspects of these activities, the Army can be of great benefit in the training of leaders. The sponsorship of interagency exercises can prove particularly useful in developing common techniques and the promotion of information sharing.

Crisis Prevention: While Academic Engagement does much to prevent crises, for the purposes of this strategy, the term Crisis Prevention denotes more positive, concrete steps that exceed mere training, collaboration and the sharing of ideas.

As an example, **Interagency Facilitation** is a component of Academic Engagement. It is also a component of Crisis Prevention. However, for Crisis Prevention we are concerned with more than just training. Here, we are concerned with the actual process of information and intelligence sharing, profiling of problem areas, and shared communications systems and information networks.

Another important component of Crisis Prevention is that of

Counterterrorism. Most law enforcement agencies at the Federal and State levels have well-conceived plans for addressing limited acts of terrorism.

However, other than the FBI, few, if any, of these agencies have the ability to obtain and track intelligence in the international arena. Although the Posse Comitatus Act provides specific limitations in this area, there is much that the Army can do to enable law enforcement agencies to do their jobs better. As previously mentioned, terrorist threats are asymmetrical, and provide low level signatures. Threats from multiple terrorist sources may quickly exceed the capability of the FBI. The Army's strengths in the analysis of intelligence.

processing information, and providing that intelligence on a real time basis can be of immeasurable benefit.

While the military's role in the **Counterdrug** effort has increased in recent years, there is yet a substantial amount more to be done. The National Defense Authorization Act of 1989 was instrumental in providing the military with sufficient legal latitude to become a relevant participant. Currently, the Army is providing a wide range of support that includes intelligence analysts, aerial reconnaissance/ observation, investigative case support, infrared/ thermal imagery, and cannabis eradication Even though the majority of the Army's support has been focused on assisting law enforcement officials in the area of supply reduction, many believe that the Army can have an impact on demand reduction by providing role models to the communities. The Illinois National Guard has a program which does just that. The program has met with initial success.

Key to Crisis Prevention is the **Protection of Our Infrastructure**. The President's newly appointed Commission on the Protection of the Nation's Infrastructure is evidence of our leadership's concern with the protection of the nations' infrastructure. The military already has the interagency lead in this area. Nonetheless, beyond the mere protection of these assets, there is much to be done to expand our capabilities. Expansion of the nation's information infrastructure will no doubt remain the domain of civilian enterprise. However, in those areas that stand to significantly increase the nation's capability, but offer

little in the way of profit, the Army can possibly bridge the gap. Providing school systems that have scarce resources with the ability to network with other schools and engage in distance learning via satellite on a limited basis is an example.

The Control of Our Borders is an area of increasing concern. While our border patrols have done a commendable job in the past with severely limited assets, theirs is a challenge that continues to grow exponentially. The challenge includes not only controlling the ingress of those who are seeking a better way of life, it is also stemming the flow of people and materials that may be destined to become agents in terrorist, drug related or other serious criminal activities. While there are clear limitations, the Army's intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities can be of use here just as they benefit the nation's efforts in counter drug activities.

The Army is also appropriately equipped to provide significant assistance to the nation in the **Prevention of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**. Its ability to track activities in the international arena can be of great benefit in countering the use of weapons of mass destruction in the U.S..

Training state and local law enforcement officials on the latest developments in this area will better equip them to detect low signature threats.

Environmental Protection and Rehabilitation is another important component of Crisis Prevention. Throughout the years, the Army has developed a significant amount of expertise in environmental engineering. It has the expertise, and in some cases, the requisite equipment to properly dispose of

toxic wastes, and restore previously contaminated areas. In addition, the Army's Chemical Corps has the capability of providing a vast amount of training and expertise in the handling of hazardous materials.

Industrial Base Security is another area of concern for us. Because of low signature, asymmetrical threats, we as Americans are for the first time having to deal with serious threats to our industrial base. As stated earlier, protection of these assets can be complicated because of the fact that they are quite often on private property. The manpower and equipment required to secure such facilities is an issue for private enterprise. However, Army expertise can be utilized in providing threat assessments, and proposing security measures to protect these assets.

Crisis Response: Despite our best efforts to minimize the detrimental impact of the numerous threats to our domestic environment, there will arise those incidents that cause us to have to respond rapidly. Throughout the years, the Army has demonstrated that it has the structure and systems to effectively handle crises. Its most significant strengths are its ability to rapidly move people and equipment, and its expertise in the command, control, and communications arena. We can expect that crises could possibly occur in the area of natural disasters, counter- drug operations, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, counter terrorism and limited counter insurgency operations. Except for natural disasters and counter insurgency, we have already addressed

the role that the Amy could possibly play in each of these areas. However, in response to a crisis, the major focus is on quickly standing up some sort of command and control, facilitating the interagency process by sharing intelligence, information and communications, providing relevant real time information to decision makers, and possibly providing transportation as well as area security initially.

In the event of a **Natural Disaster**, the primary tasks are to utilize the Army's command and control structure to quickly bring resources, and numerous federal agencies together to work in concert. While that is the principal job of FEMA, the vast resources of the Army can help significantly in this process.

In terms of providing a response to an **Insurgency**, the military can be of great benefit to law enforcement by providing intelligence analysts and equipment where appropriate. Once again, the effort is not to circumvent the Posse Comitatus Act and assume the role of law enforcement. Rather, it is to provide expertise and possible equipment on a moment's notice to better enable law enforcement agencies to handle crisis situations.

Consequence Management: Consequence Management is defined as "those essential services and activities required to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes. Such services may include transportation, communications, public works and engineering, fire fighting, information planning, mass care, resources support, health and medical

services, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials, food, and energy."<sup>42</sup>

Due to the nature of this type of operation, state and local governments must be the lead agencies with the federal government providing assistance only when the capabilities of the state and local governments have been exhausted.

## THE RULES

A Domestic Strategy that details the Army's efforts along a spectrum of possible activities that include Academic Engagement, Crisis Prevention, Crisis Response, and Consequence Management is an appropriate one. It is a strategy that will assist in promoting domestic prosperity while at the same time, allowing us to maintain readiness to fight and win when called upon. Outlining such a strategy could enable us to further develop operational objectives in support of the nation's policies. Suitable tactics, techniques, and procedures would soon follow.

In an essential effort to maintain a healthy relationship with civilian leadership however, constraints and restraints must be applied. Those outlined by Senator Sam Nunn in 1993 remain valid. They are as follows:

- 1. All projects must be undertaken in a manner that is consistent with the unit's military mission.
  - 2. The same service cannot be provided by a civilian agency.

3. The requirements must not downgrade the warfighting capability of the service.<sup>43</sup>

In addition to the guidelines conceived by Senator Nunn, we should add the following:

- 4. Make maximum utilization of Reserve Component assets prior to considering committing Active Component forces.
- 5. Never employ the Army as a source of free labor (as we did in the Olympic games in Atlanta). Troop labor should utilized only in times of crisis, and only when the capabilities of state and local agencies have been exceeded.
- 6. Because of the potential for adverse consequences, soldiers will not be employed in domestic peacekeeping roles as a general rule. The use of Army forces will be considered for such tasks only as a last resort.
- 7. An immediate assessment of the cost of the operation must be made in terms of the impact on the Army's budget. Fiscal responsibilities should be established at the outset where feasible.
- 8. The operation must be an appropriate mission for the Army. It must be in compliance with established laws, it should be in the interest of the Army to conduct the operation, and it should not unnecessarily risk the safety of soldiers.

## CONCLUSIONS

From the focus of the national leadership and the sentiment of the American people, one can easily deduce that the most important issues facing the country today are in the domestic arena. One could also demonstrate that throughout the evolution of our country, the focus of the military has shifted as the focus of the nation changed. As the nation has realigned its priorities and placed domestic needs first, the quintessential issue is whether or not the Army has a relevant role in that arena. The follow on question is whether the Army should become a significant player in domestic support. The answer to both questions is yes.

There is clear historical precedent for the Army's involvement in the domestic arena. It has been a significant player from the very beginning in the expansion of this country's economic and technological capabilities in the past. It should continue to do so in the future. We can see that the instability brought about by economic globalization, combined with the benefits and pitfalls associated with the advent of the information age have created a domestic environment that is faced with new challenges and threats as well as some traditional threats that may have been enhanced by several orders of magnitude. The Army has a number of assets to call upon in order to provide assistance to the nation. These fall primarily in the realm of health, engineering, environmental

engineering, transport, information, intelligence, civil affairs, and military police assets.

We therefore have precedent, a need, the assets to address the need, and most important, the opportunity. This opportunity has not existed since the onset of the Cold War, and we will not have it always. With the rise of a near peer competitor in the future, the conditions will change. While we have the opportunity, it is prudent to develop a comprehensive strategy and maximize our potential.

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